Public Assistance of Police during Criminal Investigations: Russian Experience by Semukhina, Olga B.
Marquette University
e-Publications@Marquette
Social and Cultural Sciences Faculty Research and
Publications Social and Cultural Sciences, Department of
6-1-2016




Accepted version. Police Practice and Research, Vol. 17, No. 3 ( June 2016): 229-248. DOI. © 2016
Taylor & Francis. Used with permission.
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
Police Practice and Research, Vol. 17, No. 3 (June 2016): pg. 229-248. DOI. This article is © Taylor & Francis (Routledge) 
and permission has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Taylor & Francis (Routledge) 
does not grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express 





Public Assistance of Police During 








Abstract: This study examines the high levels of public unwillingness to 
assist police in criminal investigations in Russia. Variables of public trust of 
police, fear of crime, victimization, and prior contact with police are used to 
explain this phenomenon. Also included in the study are variables of police 
fear and avoidance of police. The findings suggest that higher levels of 
distrust in, as well as fear and avoidance of police are strong predictors of 
citizens’ unwillingness to assist police in Russia. The paper discusses potential 
implications of these findings for the 2011 police reform in Russia. 
 
Introduction  
Strong public support and public-police cooperation are key 
factors in effective social control performed by police in every society. 
Russia continues to experience serious problems in these areas, 
lagging significantly behind most western countries (Jackson et al., 
2011). Recent survey data suggests that despite numerous reforms in 
the criminal justice system, many Russians continue to hold negative 
views of their police and refuse to cooperate with them. According to 
the data by Levada Center collected in 2013, only 41% of citizens are 
willing to assist the police in investigation (Levada, 2013). The study 
by WCIOM1 in 2012 concludes that only 45% of Russians will agree to 
be a witness in a criminal case (WCIOM, 2012b). The low level of 
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public willingness to cooperate with police in Russia is briefly discussed 
in extant scholarship, mostly in descriptive analyses or qualitative 
studies; to this date, we find no research that provides an empirical 
quantitative examination into the factors responsible for the lack of 
public-police cooperation in Russia.  The purpose of this study is to 
understand the root causes of low public-police cooperation during 
criminal investigations in Russia. More specifically, we are concerned 
with determining if poor police performance or fear and avoidance of 
police are responsible for Russian citizens’ unwillingness to cooperate 
with police during criminal investigations.  
Russian police went through a tremendous transformation after 
the breakdown of the Soviet Union in 1991. During 1970s-1980s, 
Soviet police experienced a period of stability with relatively low crime 
rates and favorable public views (Semukhina & Reynolds, 2013). Due 
to rapid political and economic changes occurring during the 
perestroika in the 1990s, Russian police found themselves grossly 
understaffed and underfunded while facing skyrocketing crime rates 
(Sergevnin & Kovalyov, 2013). Confronted with such challenges, 
Russian police officers often resorted to bribery, abuse of power and 
violence as survival tactics (Gudkov, Dubin, & Leonova, 2004; 
Shepeleva & Novikova, 2005). It was during the 1990s when levels of 
public trust and public-police cooperation in Russia plummeted to 
record low numbers (Gilinskiy, 2000, 2006; Gudkov & Dubin, 2006; 
Levada, 2013). During the decade of the 2000s, crimes rates and 
police funding and personnel stabilized (Sergevnin & Kovalyov, 2013). 
Nevertheless, the levels of public-police cooperation remain low today 
(Semukhina & Reynolds, 2013).  
Theoretical framework 
The criminological theory of process-based policing has been 
predominantly used in recent literature to explain the issues of public-
police cooperation. This theory often links public-police cooperation 
and compliance with the public conception of police legitimacy. 
Legitimacy is primarily understood as the ability of the police 
institution to influence the individuals not by the use of power, but 
because the individuals believe that the authority of police is “proper”, 
and “right” (Tyler, 2006; Tyler & Huo, 2002). There are two main 
approaches extant literature utilizes to understand police legitimacy: 
the instrumental and normative schools of thought (Sunshine & Tyler, 
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2003). The former is a utilitarian approach that emphasizes the “cost” 
and “benefits” of cooperating with police for the citizens. This approach 
focuses on associations among police effectiveness, satisfaction with 
police contact, victimization, fear of crime, and public willingness to 
cooperate with police (Nagin, 1998; Skogan & Frydl, 2004). According 
to the instrumental approach, the conception of police legitimacy and 
consequently public willingness to cooperate with the police during 
investigations are based on self-interest, rational decision-making and 
reasons of prudence and fear of punishment (Bottoms & Tankebe, 
2012). If police effectively deter potential offenders from committing 
crimes and fairly distribute police services among all citizens, the 
levels of public-police cooperation remain high (Sunshine & Tyler, 
2003). The instrumental approach advocates increased effectiveness of 
police performance as the key factor in developing successful public-
police cooperation; thus, past positive experiences with police are 
crucial for future public assistance of police with criminal investigation 
(Skogan & Frydl, 2004; Tyler et al., 2007). Furthermore, poor police 
performance demonstrated through high levels of fear of crime, 
victimization and low satisfaction with police are deemed responsible 
for the low levels of future public cooperation (Tyler, et al., 2007).  
The second school of thought, known as the normative model of 
police legitimacy, is concerned with the link between procedural justice 
and public willingness to cooperate with the police. The normative 
school does not dictate that a simple cost-benefit analysis can explain 
the public-police relations; rather, it emphasizes that people are moral 
agents concerned more with issues of “proper” authority than 
maximizing their benefits and positive outcomes (Reisig, Tankebe, & 
Mesko, 2013). The studies on procedural justice assert that a duty to 
obey police and cooperate with them comes from a greater concept of 
police legitimacy grounded in public trust of police as an institution and 
an understanding that the police act in the best interests of the 
citizenry (Murphy, Hinds, & Fleming, 2008; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003).  
Hence, the police need "to activate feelings of obligation and 
responsibility for their effectiveness" among citizens in order to 
achieve high levels of cooperation in criminal investigation (Tyler, 
2006, p. 13; 2013). These feelings are based primarily on shared 
value consensus and understanding that the police are making 
decisions fairly and transparently, and that they can be trusted in 
making the right decisions for the community (Sunshine & Tyler, 
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2003; Tyler & Huo, 2002). This understanding is grounded in the idea 
that public trust in the police institution and pertinent public-police 
cooperation is a social judgment, which is based on the shared sense 
of morality and is not a simple accumulation of positive past 
experiences. The normative antecedents of police legitimacy are often 
linked to studies on community-based policing, a model that is built on 
the idea of policing by consent (Reisig, 2007). Consent and voluntary 
compliance are believe to be logical outcomes of fair decision-making 
by police and perceptions of value consensus between police and 
citizens (Hinds & Murphy, 2007; Tyler, 2006; Tyler & Huo, 2002). 
Traditionally, the normative approach to police legitimacy have 
been favored over the instrumental one in the studies on the process-
based model of policing (Hinds & Murphy, 2007; Reisig, Tankebe, & 
Mesko, 2014; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003). However, recently, there has 
been an attempt to reconcile both instrumental and normative schools 
by emphasizing that the two approaches are not mutually exclusive 
but rather complimentary ideas (Tankebe, 2008, 2013). According to 
this dialogic approach, police legitimacy is viewed as a complex 
phenomenon where the police effectiveness mediates the procedural 
fairness and the police trustworthiness, which at the end leads to the 
public compliance and cooperation with police (Tankebe, 2008). 
Extant studies on public-police cooperation conducted in the 
United States repeatedly suggest that procedural antecedents of police 
legitimacy are critical in understanding the phenomenon of public-
police cooperation. Researchers in the U.S. found that citizens who 
believe that the police treat them fairly and respectfully were more 
likely to cooperate with the police regardless of the citizen’s socio-
economic status, past experiences with crime, and crime rates in the 
area (Reisig, 2007; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Tyler, 2013). Studies on 
public-police cooperation outside the U.S. also conclude that factors of 
procedural justice (e.g. fairness in decision-making and motive-based 
trust) are critical in predicting public-police cooperation, however the 
variables of instrumental legitimacy (e.g. police performance) also play 
an important role (Hinds & Murphy, 2007; Murphy, et al., 2008; Reisig 
& Lloyd, 2009; Reisig, et al., 2013; Reisig, et al., 2014; Tankebe, 
2008).  
Our study stems from the findings of both schools and examines 
whether factors of poor police performance or abuse of power are 
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responsible for the unwillingness of Russian citizens to assist the police 
in criminal investigations. In this regard, our paper examines factors of 
procedural justice (trust, fear and avoidance of police) as well as 
instrumental variables of performance (fear of crime, prior contact 
with police, and prior victimization) as potential reasons for low public-
police cooperation in Russia.  
Previous studies 
Table 1 around here 
 Table 1 provides a summary of selected empirical studies on 
Russian police. Available data suggests that at least 30% of Russians 
routinely refuse to report crimes, and less than half of all surveyed 
residents are willing to assist police in criminal investigation or contact 
police in life-threatening situations. The majority of Russians believe 
that the police are uninterested in cooperating (WCIOM, 2012c), and 
most victims do not report crimes due to their belief that the police are 
unable to solve them (INDEM2, 2007; Public Verdict Fund, 2010). 
Studies in Table 2 also demonstrate that Russia's records on public 
trust of police is poor with at least 50% of Russians refusing to trust 
the police in any given year. Pervasive distrust of police in Russia is 
associated with the feeling that the police do not act in the best 
interest or share the values of the citizenry; between 15% and 25% of 
Russians feel this way in any given year (Gudkov & Dubin, 2006; 
Rimskyi, 2012; WCIOM, 2012a).  
 Both distrust and lack of value consensus between the police 
and public are coupled with significant levels of police fear in Russia 
with 25% to 46% of Russians reporting to fear police officers (Table 
1). Whereas in other counties fear of police is experienced primarily by 
members of marginalized groups, in Russia these feelings are 
spreading among all groups of the population (FOM3, 2012a). Fear of 
police appears to be a natural consequence of perceived and 
experienced police abuse and avoidance of the police is commonly 
employed by many Russians to minimize police victimization (Zernova, 
2012). 
 Studies on Russia suggest that between 21% and 30% of 
Russians are victimized every year (Bezaev, 1999; Gilinskiy, 2000; 
Goriyanov, 1994; Makarova, 2011). Literature also reports that most 
Russian victims are not satisfied with the results of police contact 
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following victimization (Bezaev, 1999; INDEM, 2001; Rimskyi, 2012; 
Shepeleva & Novikova, 2005). Research demonstrates that in the past 
twenty years the majority of Russians experienced significant levels of 
fear of crime or concerns with crime rates (Gilinskiy, 2000; Shubkin, 
1997). Between 40% and 50% of Russians reported to fear 
victimization in the last 10 years (Beck & Robertson, 2003; Gudkov, et 
al., 2004; Ivanova & Shubkin, 2005; Lelekov  & Tyamin, 2005; 
Savel'ev, 2010; WCIOM, 2012c).  
Research hypotheses: 
 Based on discussed literature stemming from both the utilitarian 
and procedural schools, we propose that public unwillingness to 
cooperate with police during criminal investigation is grounded in 
either ineffective police performance or fear of police due to abuse of 
power. The following are the research hypotheses for this study: 
1) Public trust of police, 2) fear of police, 3) avoidance of police, 4) 
fear of crime, 5) victimization, 6) prior police contact, and 7) 
demographics are related to public-police cooperation in Russia. 
Methodology 
 The study is based on survey data collected by the author in the 
Volgograd region, Russia in June 2009 with a sample size of 540 
cases. The Volgograd region is one of eighty-six subjects of federation 
located in Southern Russia with a current population of 2,604,000 
residents as of 2013. The population of the Volgograd region consists 
of 90% ethnic Russians; 54% of Volgograd residents practice Orthodox 
Christianity. There have been 10.5 crimes committed per 1,000 
residents in six months of 2012 in Volgograd region (the Russian 
national average is 8.72) and the crime rates continued to decline by 
5% in 2012 since 2011 and by 25.3% since 2001.4 The Volgograd 
region also averages 1.9% in unemployment rate (with nation-wide 
rate of 2.1%) and the structure of population income is similar to the 
nation-wide structure.5 
 
Multistage random sampling technique was utilized in this study. 
The sampling technique was performed in three stages. At the first 
stage, administrative districts that most closely represented the study 
population criteria were selected. This sampling methodology 
permitted a variation of +/- 1.5 percent from the calculated 
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proportions for each of the four sampling quota categories (the 
proportion of the urban/rural population, gender, geographical crime 
rate, and age).  The authors calculated the sampling quotas using 
official demographic information published by the Russian State 
Statistical Department. Variables in location of residence, gender, 
geographical crime rates, and age were used to develop the quota 
elements. In the second sampling stage, public and private 
organizations listed in the official government registry of organizations 
within a specific administrative area were selected. Universities, 
pension foundations, and unemployment agencies that included 
students, retired, and unemployed populations, respectively, 
supplemented the selected organizations. During the third stage, the 
author selected specific individuals from lists provided by each 
organization. The individual candidate list was alphabetized, and then 
the author employed systematic sampling with an interval of 20-25 
individuals. No quotas were applied at this stage of selection. Research 
assistants conducted the surveys of selected individuals face-to-face.  
 
Table 2 around here 
 
 Table 2 provides a comparison between known parameters of 
the entire Russian population and the Volgograd region. As shown in 
Table 2, main demographic parameters between the Volgograd region 
and the Russian Federation population are similar with exception to 
age and place of residency. The Volgograd region is slightly older, less 
rural and has a higher level of college-educated individuals. However, 
these differences are negligible for the purposes of this study; thus, 
Volgograd region can be used as a first-cut approximation to the entire 
population of Russia. 
 
The comparison of known parameters of the Russian Federation 
and the study sample (age, gender, and education) suggests that the 
population and the study sample demonstrate similar age and gender 
distribution. However, the sample is overrepresented by the number of 
college-degree respondents. Thus, it can be suggested that the study 
sample is somewhat representative of the Volgograd region population 
and can be used as a rough approximation for the entire population of 
Russia.  
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The analysis of sample proceeded in two major stages. First, 
seven hypotheses were derived from the process-based model of 
policing. Secondly, the hypotheses were tested using the multiple 
binominal logistic regressions due to the ordinal nature of the main 
dependent variable of the study (O'Connell, 2006).  
 
The primary dependent variable of this study, "willingness to 
assist police in criminal investigation," was measured by asking the 
following question: "Would you be willing to assist the police during a 
criminal investigation?” Previous research employs similar 
measurements to examine public-police cooperation in Russia and 
reports strong measurement validity (Bezaev, 1999; FOM, 2012b; 
Makarova, 2011). The independent variables included trust of police, 
fear of police, fear of crime, prior victimization, prior police contact and 
avoidance of police. The motive-based trust in police has been 
measured through the question of whether or not "the police can be 
trusted to make decisions that are right for [the respondent’s] 
community". This measurement is frequently used by other 
researchers of process-based model of police (Reisig, Bratton, & Gertz, 
2007) and is consistent with Russian-based studies on the public trust 
of police (Gudkov, et al., 2004). The fear of crime variable is measured 
through a traditional question on whether the respondent feels safe 
being out alone in their neighborhood at night. The question has been 
previously validated in various studies on fear of crime (Ho & McKean, 
2004). Victimization is measured through a self-report within the last 
three years (Have you been a victim of a crime in the last 3 years?"). 
Fear of police is measured by asking if the respondent feels fear when 
he/she sees an approaching police officer. The reputable Russian-
based survey center of LEVADA used same measurement for studies 
on public fear of police (Gudkov, et al., 2004).6 Avoidance of police is 
measured by asking to agree with the statement “It is better to avoid 
police even when you don’t break the law”. Similar question was used 
by LEVADA center to measure avoidance of police and demonstrated 
strong measurement validity (Gudkov & Dubin, 2006; Gudkov, et al., 
2004).  A multi-item scale is preferable over the single variables used 
in this study, but such a measurement instrument was not possible 
due to the limitations on the survey length.7 
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Table 3 around here 
  
Tables 3-5 provide a cross-sectional frequency analysis of main 
variables in the study (public-police cooperation, public fear and 
avoidance of police, trust of police, victimization and contact with 
police) and the sample’s demographics (age, gender, education, 
income, and occupation). According to Table 3, only 27.6% of 
respondents feel it is safe to assist the Russian police in criminal 
investigation and 49.9% feels it is not. While all categories of the 
sample have predominately negative feelings about public-police 
cooperation, some are more critical of police than others. There are 
much more respondents who feel unsafe about cooperating with police 
among older and female respondents. Retired individuals are also 
more likely to fear assisting the police, whereas industry employees 
are less likely. Those with lower monthly income (under 7K)8 are also 
more fearful of cooperating with police than those with higher monthly 
income (18K and higher). 
  
Table 3 also demonstrates that an overwhelming number of 
Russians (74%) experience fear when they see an approaching police 
officer.  Only 6.9% of citizens don’t feel this way in our sample. As 
with the public-police cooperation, older groups of the population are 
more affected by the fear of police than younger respondents are. 
Males and females are equally fearful of police officers, even though 
there are more males who have never experienced fear of an 
approaching police officer.  Fear of police is represented in all 
categories of Russians with various occupations and levels of monthly 
income.  
 
Table 4 around here 
 
 Based on Table 4, the majority of Russians (60.2%) prefer to 
avoid the police under any circumstances. Only 18.9% did not adopt 
such a defensive mechanism. Similar to public-police cooperation and 
fear of police, older Russians and females are more likely to avoid the 
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police than younger groups and males. Retired and college-educated 
individuals are more likely to avoid the police. All income groups and 
various types of occupation are equally affected by police avoidance. 
 
 Table 4 also reveals some interesting findings. Although most 
Russians fear, avoid and refuse to cooperate with police, a large group 
of Russians (44.6%) feels protected from crime by their local police, 
and only a small number of respondents (16.7%) do not feel 
protected. Older Russians (51 and older), females in general and 
retired respondents appear to feel less protected than those under the 
age of 30. In addition, females in general and retired respondents are 
less likely to feel protected from crime by police. Russians earning 
high-income (18K and over) seems to feel more protected than low-
income individuals (under 7K). When comparing the findings from 
Table 4 with Table 3, it can be noted that more Russians are afraid of 
the police (74%) than of the crimes committed against them (16.7%).  
 
Table 5 around here 
 
 Based on Table 5, a large number of Russians does not trust the 
police (46.6%). As with the previous findings in Tables 3 and 4, older 
individuals (over 51 years old), females and retired respondents are 
less likely to trust the police. Younger Russians (under 30 years old), 
males, and office employees appear to show higher degrees of 
confidence in their police. Similar to findings in Table 4, higher income 
groups (over 18K of monthly income) are more likely to trust the 
police, than lower income groups (under 7K a month). 
 
 Table 5 also reports on both the contact with police and 
victimization over the year prior to response. At least a quarter of 
Russians (24%) were victimized in the year prior to the survey and 
40.3% had a contact with the police during the same period. It is 
known from the literature that between 30% and 50% of all crimes are 
reported to the police by victims. This suggests that a significant 
number of police contacts in our study are either initiated by police 
and are involuntary (arrests of defendants or subpoenas of witnesses) 
or are related to the routine work of police unrelated to crime (citizen 
registration and issuance of licenses). Contrary to the findings from 
Tables 3 and 4, older respondents (over 51 years old) are less likely to 
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contact the police and become the victims of a crime. While females 
are more likely to contact the police, they are less likely to be 
victimized, which suggests that their contacts with police were mostly 
unrelated to crime. Small business owners and unemployed individuals 
are also more likely to contact the police and claim victimization. 
Respondents with various levels of income are equally represented 
among those who contacted the police and claimed victimization. 
 
Hypotheses testing 
Table 6 around here 
 
 Table 6 reports the results of binary logistic regression analysis 
for the dependent variable of opinion on public-police cooperation. The 
dependent variable is aggregated into two binary categories for this 
analysis. Only research hypotheses 1, 2, 3 and 5 of this study are fully 
supported and research hypothesis 7 is partially supported.  
The significant predictors of odd ratio for public unwillingness to 
cooperate with police during criminal investigations include fear of 
crime, fear of police, police violence, distrust of police, prior 
victimization, and income. None of the other demographic variables 
(age, gender, occupation, and level of education) are significantly 
correlated with the public-police cooperation variable. Even more 
interesting, the variables of police effectiveness in protecting citizens 
against crime, and contact with police are also non-significant in our 
research model. The overall percentage of cases predicted through our 
model is 74.2%, which is increased by 7.8% when compared to the 
null model. 
Limitations, discussion, and implications 
 Several important limitations of this study must be noted. First, 
the study sample is not fully representative of the Russian Federation; 
thus, generalizations to the entire country warrant some caution. The 
sample is overrepresentative of respondents living in large cities, as 
well as respondents with college degrees. Russia also has large 
regional heterogeneity, so the Volgograd region does not fully 
represent Russia's population diversity. Regions with large ethnic 
minorities (i.e. North Caucuses, Tatarstan, and Bashkortostan) and 
large metropolitan cities like Moscow and St. Petersburg may have 
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significant variations in demographics that can influence public-police 
cooperation and views of police.  
 Secondly, the cross-tabulation statistics from Tables 3-5 should 
be used only as preliminary descriptive findings. Since some of the 
data distribution in the cells was skewed and not all the cells reached a 
required minimum, we were unable to use non-parametric statistics to 
assess the significance of these findings.  
 The major conclusion of this study is not very surprising: low-
income respondents that fear, distrust and avoid police are less likely 
to cooperate with the police in criminal investigation because they 
consider assistance to be risky. Surprisingly, prior contacts with police 
and perceived police effectiveness do not have statistically significant 
correlations with cooperating during criminal investigation. Moreover, 
nearly half of Russian citizens feels protected by their local police 
(44.6%), yet nearly the same proportion (49.9%) think it is dangerous 
to assist the police in criminal investigation. The most plausible 
explanation of this paradox is that the danger of assisting police in 
Russia comes not from the criminal offenders, but rather from the 
police themselves. In our study, only 16.7% reported to feel 
unprotected from crime, while the overwhelming majority 74% stated 
they were afraid of police officers. 
 Existing literature and examples from human rights 
organizations support this proposition. Police officers in Russia are 
among the top violators of human rights and appear to be routinely 
involved in both torture and corruption (Amnesty International, 2002; 
Chistye Ruki (Clean Hands), 2012; Committee against Torture, 2006; 
Human Rights Watch, 1999; Public Verdict Fund, 2012). Literature 
suggests that abuse from police inflict fear and consequentially police 
avoidance and non-cooperation among all groups of the Russian 
population.   
 Based on our findings, the instrumental approach to police 
legitimacy only partially explains the low levels of public-police 
cooperation in Russia; neither police effectiveness nor prior police 
contact have statistically significant correlations with public 
cooperation with police. It appears that citizens refuse to cooperate 
with Russian police not because the “cost” of cooperation is too high 
compared to the “benefits” (i.e. police effectiveness in crime control is 
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too low when compared to the time and resources spent to cooperate). 
In other words, the lack of police legitimacy in Russia comes not from 
the substandard police performance to investigate the crimes, but 
from an understanding that Russian police act in their self-interest. In 
such a case, citizens deem future assistance of police unnecessary 
since the police are perceived as uninterested in protecting the public. 
However, the factors of police performance should not be disregarded 
completely since variables of prior victimization and fear of crime 
appear to be significant in our model. 
 The procedural justice approach appears to better explain the 
phenomenon of Russian non-cooperation during  criminal 
investigation. Fear of victimization by the police themselves drastically 
undermines images of police fairness and legitimacy in the eyes of 
Russian citizens. These feelings are the foundation of public 
cooperation with police according to the procedural justice approach 
(Sunshine & Tyler, 2003). Logically, voluntarily assisting the police 
increases the probability of being victimized by the police from the 
simple fact of increased interaction with them. Avoidance of police in 
such a case is viewed as logical adaptive practice developed in the 
presence of the clear danger to become a victim of police abuse. 
The statistically significant correlation between the motive-
based distrust of police and public-police non-cooperation in our study 
supports this explanation since trust in police is the main characteristic 
of police legitimacy in the procedural justice approach. Lack of motive-
based trust reinforces the image of Russian police as a self-serving 
agency, where the public views most criminal investigations as tools 
for personal gain by police officers rather than enforcement of law and 
order for greater social interest. Understandably, such views deter 
future cooperation with police by the citizenry.  
If abuse of power by the police is indeed the main culprit of 
public non-cooperation with police in Russia, it is important to 
understand the source of knowledge about such police practices. Do 
such public views come from first-hand experiences or secondary 
knowledge? Our study suggests that at least some of these views are 
based on projections by news and entertainment media and other 
sources of communication. In our study, older and retired individuals 
were consistently found to have higher levels of fear, avoidance, 
distrust of and non-cooperation with the police. Yet, these respondents 
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were the least likely to be the victims of the crime or to contact the 
police, suggesting that their fears came from sources beyond 
experience. Extant literature on experienced police abuse also 
supports this proposition since only a small number of Russians 
reported to be victimized by police, yet the majority fear the police 
abuse (Public Verdict Fund, 2012).  
Findings from this study are consistent with previous research 
on public-police cooperation conducted in other countries. Variables of 
procedural fairness play an important role in our understanding of the 
low levels of public cooperation with police during criminal 
investigation, whereas the factors of police performance have only a 
limited role in explaining the unwillingness of Russians to assist the 
police. Similar findings have been found in study samples of the U.S., 
Australia and Slovenia (Hinds & Murphy, 2007; Reisig, 2007; Reisig, et 
al., 2013; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003).  
Also consistent with research conducted outside U.S. (Tankebe, 
2008), our study found little difference in levels of public-police 
cooperation among various demographic groups. None of the 
demographic variables (age, gender, education, and occupation) with 
the exception of income had statistically significant effects on levels of 
public willingness to assist police in our model. Previous research 
suggests that such findings are typical of countries where the police 
face crises of legitimacy and no demographic group offers full support 
of the police (Tankebe, 2008). In this regard, our findings support the 
proposition by Gerber, et al., who suggest that Russian police practice 
represents an example of predatory policing, where the police officers 
"prey on their society by using their positions to extract direct 
payment in the form of money, goods, or services from individual 
members of the public" (Gerber & Mendelson, 2008, p. 5). This 
policing model is different from a model of divided society policing, 
where the police in the interests of dominant elite groups 
systematically oppress marginalized groups of the population (the 
poor, ethnic minorities, and political opposition). The high levels of 
police fear and avoidance reported in this paper are also consistent 
with the predatory model of policing in which law enforcement 
practices are used for the self-interest of police officers rather than to 
build a consent-based policing model. 
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The conclusions of this paper provide strong support for the 
procedural theory of police legitimacy, which suggests that fair 
decision-making and social judgment about trustworthiness of police 
officers are important antecedents of public-police cooperation. 
Though police effectiveness in crime control and fair distribution of 
police services should not be disregarded completely, they clearly play 
secondary roles in our explanatory model. In this regard, our paper 
advances a theoretical understanding of Russian policing since 
previous studies offered only descriptive data on the lack of public-
police cooperation. Findings of this paper are also consistent with 
previous studies on Russian police, but this paper takes our 
understanding further by offering empirical evidence that public-police 
cooperation in Russia is dependent on factors of distrust and fear of 
police and consequential avoidance of them.  
Findings from this study also have important practical 
implications for the ongoing police reform in Russia. The 2011 reforms 
consisted of several important measures including raises in wages and 
benefit of police officers, review of personnel files for all police officers 
(pereattestatsiya), consolidation of police funding under the federal 
budget, 20% personnel cuts, and development of better police 
assessment and reporting systems (Beck, 2013). Whereas most of the 
recent government efforts were focused on improving the 
effectiveness of crime control (Gall, 2011), the findings of this paper 
suggest that improved police performance may not directly translate 
into public willingness to cooperate with police during criminal 
investigation. From our research model, it appears that overcoming 
the public fear and avoidance of police and building public trust of 
police should be the priority of future police reform in Russia.  
One of the major issues that needs to be addressed in this 
regard is growing alienation between Russian citizens and police 
officers. Findings from other post-Soviet countries recommend that 
increased accountability and transparency of major law enforcement 
decisions are needed to create a value consensus and societal trust 
that the police act in the best interests of the citizenry and not preying 
on citizens for personal benefit (Beck, 2013; Light, 2013). Experiences 
of other post-Soviet countries suggest that bridging the gap between 
the public and police is a long-term process that may require drastic 
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measures and significant government resources (Kakachia & O’Shea, 
2012).  
The issue of effective public accountability necessarily relates to 
the question of better enforcement of laws against police corruption 
and torture. Currently, the majority of bribery and corruption cases 
among police officers remain uninvestigated; the few police officers 
who are prosecuted often receive minimal penalties (Semukhina & 
Reynolds, 2013). At this point, it is unclear whether there is a political 
will in Russia to change the current situation of predatory policing and 
to build consent-based policing used in other developed countries. 
Taylor in his analysis of Putin's presidency suggests that Russian law 
enforcement agencies in general and the current efforts to reform 
them have been successfully used to develop the capacity of Russian 
state-building but intentionally failed to achieve any quality of state 
offered services. If the analysis by Taylor is accurate, the current 2011 
reforms of Russian law enforcement agencies are made primarily to 
strengthen the capacity of Russian state (Taylor, 2011). In such a 
case, success of future police reforms in Russia remains questionable. 
Though Russian police are almost universally viewed as 
ineffective, another measure required to build an effective public-
police cooperation is media coverage aimed at breaking stereotypical 
images of Russian police force. Current relationships between the 
media and Russian police are often based on the outdated Soviet 
strategy to conceal any information from the media or to provide very 
limited access to any information on the cases of police abuse. As a 
result, media is often left with speculation, rumors and other unreliable 
sources when covering a story of police abuse. In the atmosphere of 
great distrust of police in Russian society, these media speculations 
paint a predominately negative image of policemen and play an 
important role in shaping the image of abusive police officers in Russia 
(Bondarenko, 2006). Female, older, and retired respondents are 
among the most frequent consumers of TV media content (MacFadyen, 
2008), which may explain their elevated fears of police and 
unwillingness to assist police in criminal investigation despite the lack 
of victimization or direct police contact found in this study.  
The situation is now becoming even more serious with the 
development of social media and accessibility of the internet in Russia. 
Young and college-educated Russians are among frequent internet 
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users and consumers of social media content. This content is very 
critical to police reputation, but is often based on unverifiable sources 
(Etling et al., 2010). Several researchers suggest that negative views 
of police by younger generations are often prompted by internet media 
content rather than first-hand experiences (Bondarenko, 2006; Etling, 
et al., 2010; Mazaev, 2004). Police violence, torture and exposé from 
former police officers became a normal part of Russian internet 
landscape in the last five years (Chistyakova & Robertson, 2012). 
Thus, the Ministry of Interior Affairs is in dire need for a new media 
strategy in which timely information and a friendly environment for 
dialogue are provided to the public.  
Finally, there is also a need to revise the assessment and 
promotion system for police officers. Currently existing system 
measures primarily crime rates and other factors of police efficiency 
(Brailovskaya, 2011). Findings from this study suggest that improved 
police performance alone is unlikely to cause better public-police 
cooperation. Instead, the system of assessment should incorporate 
indicators of public views on police including assessment of each police 
contact and independent surveys of public opinions.  In the current 
assessment system, such indicators are only used as supplementary 
measurements and they public views surveys are often conducted by 
sociological organizations selected by the police themselves 
(Khabarov, 2011).  
This study is only a preliminary attempt to explore the issues of 
public-police cooperation in Russia. More research is necessary to fully 
understand the factors influencing public fear and avoidance of police. 
Future research should consider a fully representative sample of the 
Russian Federation to account for regional differences in public views 
of police. Another suggestion for future research is to test a full set of 
variables on procedural fairness of police (previously developed by 
Tyler (2002)) in Russian context. Such research will allow for a valid 
comparison of public-police cooperation in Russia with the U.S. and 
other countries. The use of multi-item scales by Tyler also provides for 
better measurement and constructs validity. Other measures of public-
police cooperation should also be tested including the sense of 
obligation to obey police officers, as well as actual crime reporting 
behavior. It would also be beneficial to look at the role of media in 
shaping these public views and to examine the role of police reform on 
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the public perceptions of the police institution. Finally, it would be 
illuminating to understand how ethnic minorities, especially labor 
immigrants, perceive cooperation with Russian police and to what 
extent their views of the police are different from the general 
population.  
Conclusion 
The purpose of this research paper was to look at the root 
causes of the low levels of public-police cooperation in Russia over the 
past two decades. This study reveals that variables of public trust in 
police, fear of police and police avoidance are important predictors of 
future public-police cooperation during criminal investigations in 
Russia. On the other hand, police effectiveness and prior police contact 
are not significant when predicting public willingness to assist Russian 
police. These findings are consistent with the process-based model of 
policing which informed this research. 
The study suggests that indicators of police performance do not 
play an important role in predicting future public cooperation in Russia. 
We conclude that the current low levels of public willingness to assist 
Russian police are mainly caused by the crisis of police legitimacy due 
to the lack of transparency of police decisions and as well as a lack of 
trust that the police act in the best interests of the citizenry. This 
conclusion is consistent with the predatory model of policing described 
by Gerber et al (2008) when police use their authority for self-serving 
purposes and not for protection of citizenry.  
Important lessons can be learned from this study regarding 
future police reforms in Russia. While it is still important to improve 
crime control efficiency of Russian police, the future changes should be 
focused on building better public-police relations and strengthening the 
public image of Russian police. New mechanisms need to be developed 
for better police accountability and prevention of police corruption and 
abuse of power. Such measures include but are not limited to further 
decentralization and demilitarization of police forces, election of local 
police officials, transparency of major decision-making through public 
hearings, and revisions of assessment and promotion system. Results 
of police reforms in other post-Soviet countries suggest that 
improvement within post-Soviet police institutions is a long-term 
process, which requires commitment of both power agents and 
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members of civil society. Police reform in Russia therefore must to be 
done in conjunction with transformation in other criminal justice 
institutions, especially the court system. (Zernova, 2012).   
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Table 2. Comparison of Demographic Characteristics, and Crime Rates 
for the Russian Federation and Volgograd Region  
Criteria  Russian Federation Volgograd region 
Age: 
0-4 7,955,703 (5.61%) 135,924 (5.25%) 
5-9 6,880,863 (4.85%) 118,264 (4.57%) 
10-14 6,564,046 (4.63%) 115,633 (4.46%) 
15-19 8,495,662 (5.99%) 155,529 (6.01%) 
20-24 12,256,143 (8.64%) 217,291 (8.39%) 
25-29 12,257,349 (8.64%) 217,790 (8.41%) 
30-34 10,798,991 (7.61%) 191,865 (7.41%) 
35-39 10,068,892 (7.10%) 179,639 (6.94%) 
40-44 9,193,316 (6.48%) 166,171 (6.42%) 
45-49 11,247,260 (7.93%) 201,366 (7.78%) 
50-54 11,260,733 (7.93%) 198,494 (7.66%) 
55-59 9,747,960 (6.87%) 181,496 (7.01%) 
60-64 6,896,925 (4.86%) 131,264 (5.07%) 
65-69 4,479,576 (3.16%) 93,899 (3.63%) 
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70-74 6,169,297 (4.35%) 133,081 (5.14%) 
75-79 3,616,578 (2.55%) 68,384 (2.64%) 
80-84 2,763,382 (1.95%) 58,204 (2.25%) 
85 plus 1,179,354 (0.83%) 25,593 (0.99%) 
Place of residence 
Urban 103,705,314 (73%) 1,954,995 (75.5%) 
Rural 38,209,195 (27%) 63,4892 (24.5%) 
Gender 
Male 67,605,133 (46.6%) 1,255,594  (46.5%) 
Female 77,561,598 (53.4%) 1,443,629  (53.5%) 
Education 
Incomplete school or lower 27,915,580 (23.1%) 517,447  (22.9%) 
High school 21,276,555 (17.5%) 424,269  (18.8%) 
Special professional education 48,296,055 (39.8%) 923,011  (40.7%) 
Incomplete college degree 3,739,718 (3.1%) 59,181  (2.6%) 
College degree 19,009,265 (15.7%) 333,628  (14.8%) 
Graduate college degree 369,134 (0.3%) 5,056  (0.2%) 
Crime rates: 
Registered crimes (per 100,000 
population) 
3,209,862 (2,211) 51,648 (1,913) 
Change compare to the previous 
year 
-10.4%  -6.9%  
Resolved crimes (per 100,000 
population) 
1,638,562 (1,128) 31,206 (1,156) 
Change compare to the previous 
year 
-3.5%  -4.3%  
Sources:Age, gender and education data are retrieved from the latest all-Russian 
Census as of 01.01.2010. Information is available from the official web-site of the 
State Statistical Agency of Russia at www.gks.ru.  Crime rate statistics for 2008 are 
retrieved from the official website of the Ministry of Interior Affairs of Russia at 
www.mvd.ru  
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Table 1. Summary of empirical studies on Russian police 
Criteria    
Did you report crime to the police? 
 Yes No  
ICVS, 1992 (theft) 31.7% 68.3%  
ICVS, 1996 
(embezzlement) 
4.6% 95.4%  
Egoryshev, 1997 29% 71%  
Makarova, 2011 44% 54%  
Are you willing to assist police in criminal investigation? 
 Yes No  
Bezaev, 1999 24.5%   
Public Verdict Fund, 2008 32%   
WCIOM, 2012c  46%  
Levada, 2013 43%   
Are you willing to contact police in a life-threatening situation? 
 Yes No  
INDEM, 2004  29%  
Gudkov, 2004 67%   
Ermolaev, 2007 (police 
officers) 
69%   
Makarova, 2011  24.8%  
Do you trust the police?    
 Yes No  
WCIOM,1989 18.6% 26.9%  
IKSI, 1996 19.5% 57.1%  
FOM,1997 19% 55%  
Robertson, 2004  45% 39%  
Levada, 2011 35% 56%  
WCIOM, 2012a 49%   
Levada, 2013 48%   
Do you fear the police officers? 
 Yes  No  
Gudkov, 2004 46% 54%  
Gryaznova, 2006 24%   
Public Verdict, 2008 28%   
FOM, 2012b 37% 56%  
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Table 6. Logistic regression model for unwillingness to assist police 
during criminal investigation 
Variables 
 
Exp(B) Sig. B Std. Error Wald  
Fear of police .311 .143 4.745 1.365 .029* 
Police avoidance .544 .114 22.613 1.724 .000* 
Protected from crime by police -.007 .148 .002 1.007 .965 
Victimization .752 .321 5.496 .471 .019* 
Gender .002 .266 .000 1.002 .441 
Education .163 .114 2.063 1.117 .154 
Occupation -.113 .112 1.026 .893 .311 
Age -.160 .092 3.003 .852 .082 
Monthly income -.351 .120 8.590 .704 .003* 
Contact with police in the last 
12 months 
.214 .291 .535 1.237 .464 
Police trust -.135 .144 .887 .874 .034* 
*- significant for 5 percent level 
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Table 3.  Public-police cooperation, fear of police and demographics  









Total Never  Seldom Sometimes Most of 
the time 
Always Total 
Age:       
18-21 10 
(21.7%) 















































15 (14.6%) 31 
(22.3%) 
37(14.2%) 92 (17%) 
41-50 12 
(26.1%) 



































0 (0%) 1 
(3.3%) 





Gender       
Male 27 
(58.7%) 











































7 (10%) 55 
(10.2%) 
0 (0%) 4 
(13.3%) 
7 (6.8%) 21 
(15.1%) 

























































22 (21.4%) 25 
(18%) 




3 (2.9%) 12 
(9.9%) 
10 (5%) 2 (2.9%) 30 (5.6%) 0 (0%) 6 (20%) 4 (3.9%) 5 
(3.6%) 
15 (5.7%) 30 (5.6%) 














Income:        
Under 4K 5 
(12.5%) 






92 (19%) 1(14.3%) 5 
(19.2%) 
18 (19.1%) 21 
(17.2%) 
47 (20%) 92 (19%) 



























0 (0%) 7 
(26.9%) 















21 (22.3%) 25 
(20.5%) 
40 (17%) 93 (19.2%) 
18K-25K 3 
(7.5%) 
13 (14.6%) 8 
(7.6%) 




5 (5.3%) 10 
(8.2%) 
23 (9.8%) 44 (9.1%) 
25K and up 3 
(7.5%) 
6 (6.7%) 6 
(5.7%) 
10 (5.5%) 1 (1.5%) 26 (5.4%) 0 (0%) 1 
(3.8%) 
3 (3.2%) 5 
(4.1%) 









70 (13%) 539 
(100%) 
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Table 4. Police avoidance, police effectiveness, and demographics  















Age:       
18-21 10 
(21.3%) 
7(12.7%) 22(19.5%) 36(20.5%) 24(16.1%) 99(18.3%) 2(7.1%) 11(17.7%) 35(16.7%) 37(21.9%) 14(19.4%) 99(18.3%) 
22-30 14 
(29.8%) 
13(23.6%) 14(12.4%) 32(18.2%) 29(19.5%) 102(18.9%) 2(7.1%) 9(14.5%) 46(22%) 33(19.5%) 12(16.7%) 102(18.9%) 
31-40 6 (12.8%) 8(14.5%) 21(18.6%) 39(22.2%) 18(12.1%) 92(17%) 2(7.1%) 12(19.4%) 33(15.8%) 31(18.3%) 14(19.4%) 92(17%) 
41-50 8(17%) 13(23.6%) 22(19.5%) 31(17.6%) 29(19.5%) 103(19.1%) 5(17.9%) 6(9.7%) 45(21.5%) 34(20.1%) 13(18.1%) 103(19.1%) 
51-60 1(2.1%) 7(12.7%) 19(16.8%) 17(9.7%) 24(16.1%) 68(12.6%) 7(25%) 14(22.6%) 22(10.5%) 18(10.7%) 7(9.7%) 68(12.6%) 
60 plus 8(17%) 7(12.7%) 15(13.3%) 21(11.9%) 25(16.8%) 76(14.1%) 10(35.7%) 10(16.1%) 28(13.4%) 16(9.5%) 12(16.7%) 76(14.1%) 
Gender       
Male 27 
(57.4%) 
28(50.9%) 69 (61.1%) 72 (40.9%) 71 (47.7%) 267 
(49.4%) 









16(57.1%) 36(58.1%) 99(47.4%) 88(52.1%) 34(47.2%) 273(50.6%) 




1(2.1%) 7(12.7%) 6(5.3%) 25(14.2%) 16(10.7%) 55(10.2%) 1(3.6%) 4(6.5%) 22(10.5%) 17(10.1%) 11(15.3%) 55(10.2%) 
Industry 
employee 
12(25.5%) 14(25.5%) 25(21.1%) 32(18.2%) 28(18.8%) 111(20.6%) 2(7.1%) 9(14.5%) 51(24.4%) 37(21.9%) 12(16.7%) 111(20.6%) 
Office 
employee 
9(19.1%) 13(23.6%) 31(27.4%) 46(26.1%) 31(20.8%) 130(24.1%) 5(17.9%) 14(22.6%) 52(24.9%) 42(24.9%) 17(23.6%) 130(24.1%) 
Student 10(21.3%) 7(12.7%) 20(17.7%) 35(19.9%) 30(20.1%) 102(18.9%) 2(7.1%) 14(22.6%) 30(14.4%) 40(23.7%) 16(22.2%) 102(18.9%) 
Unemployed 6(12.8%) 6(10.9%) 7(6.2%) 6(3.4%) 5(3.4%) 30(5.2%) 2(7.1%) 1(1.6%) 13(6.2%) 11(6.2%) 3(4.2%) 30(5.6%) 
Retired 9(19.1%) 8(14.5%) 24(21.2%) 32(18.2%) 39(26.2%) 112(20.7%) 16(57.1%) 20(32.3%) 41(19.6%) 22(13%) 13(18.1%) 112(20.7%) 
Income:        
Under 4K 9(22.5%) 8(16.3%) 22(22.2%) 32(20.3%) 21(15.2%) 92(19%) 6(22.2%) 12(20.3%) 35(18.6%) 27(18.4%) 12(19%) 92(19%) 
4K-7K 12(30%) 8(16.3%) 25(25.3%) 35(22.2%) 46(33.3%) 126(26%) 12(44.4%) 18(30.5%) 43(22.9%) 38(25.9%) 15(23.8%) 126(26%) 
7K-11K 6(15%) 13(26.5%) 20(20.2%) 40(25.3%) 24(17.4%) 103(21.3%) 5(18.5%) 9(15.3%) 38(20.2%) 39(26.5%) 12(19%) 103(21.3%) 
11K-18K 9(22.5%) 15(30.6%) 15(15.2%) 32(20.3%) 22(15.9%) 93(19.2%) 3(11.1%) 16(27.1%) 36(19.1%) 27(18.4%) 11(17.5%) 93(19.2%) 
18K-25K 3(7.5%) 4(8.2%) 11(11.1%) 14(8.9%) 12(8.7%) 44(9.1%) 0(0%) 2(3.4%) 23(12.2%) 11(7.5%) 8(12.7%) 44(9.1%) 
25K and up 1(2.5%) 1(2%) 6(6.1%) 5(3.2%) 13(9.4%) 26(5.4%) 1(3.7%) 2(3.4%) 13(6.9%) 5(3.4%) 5(7.9%) 26(5.4%) 
Total/% of 
total 
47(8.7%) 55(10.2%) 113(20.9%) 176(32.6%) 149(27.6%) 540(100%) 28(5.2%) 62(11.5%) 209(38.7%) 169(31.3%) 72(13.3%) 540(100%) 
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Table 5. Trust of police, police contact, victimization and demographics  
 How much do you trust the police Contact with police in the last 12 
months 








Total Yes No Total Yes No Total 
Age:       
18-21 4(11.4%) 18(23.4%) 33(18.8%) 35(17.4%) 9(17.6%) 99(18.3%) 36(18%) 54(18.2%) 90(18.1%) 24(19.8%) 72(18.8%) 96(19%) 
22-30 4(11.4%) 14(18.2%) 36(20.5%) 37(18.4%) 11(21.6%) 102(18.9%) 47(23.5%) 52(17.6%) 99(20%) 25(20.7%) 73(19%) 98(19.4%) 
31-40 3(8.6%) 10(13%) 32(18.2%) 38(18.9%) 9(17.6%) 92(17%) 39(19.5%) 47(15.9%) 86(17.3%) 20(16.5%) 65(16.9%) 85(16.8%) 
41-50 2(5.7%) 8(10.4%) 34(19.3%) 51(25.4%) 8(15.7%) 103(19.1%) 46(23%) 44(14.9%) 90(18.1%) 26(21.5%) 68(17.7%) 94(18.6%) 
51-60 9(25.7%) 10(13%) 22(12.5%) 20(10%) 7(13.7%) 68(12.6%) 18(9%) 44(14.9%) 62(12.5%) 13(10.7%) 51(13.3%) 64(12.7%) 
60 plus 13(37.1%) 17(22.1%) 19(10.8%) 20(10%) 7(13.7%) 76(14.1%) 14(7%) 55(18.6%) 69(13.9%) 13(10.7%) 55(14.3%) 68(13.5%) 
Gender       
Male 12(34.3%) 31(40.3%) 84(47.7%) 102(50.7%) 38(74.5%) 267(49.4%) 94(47%) 149(50.3%) 243(49%) 61(52.1%) 183(47.7%) 246(48.7%) 
Female 23(65.7%) 46(59.7%) 92(52.3%) 99(49.3%) 13(25.5%) 273(50.6%) 106(53%) 147(49.7%) 253(51%) 58(47.9%) 201(52.3%) 259(51.3%) 




1(2.9%) 8(10.4%) 17(9.7%) 26(12.9%) 3(5.9%) 55(10.2%) 23(11.5%) 26(8.8%) 49(9.9%) 18(14.9%) 32(8.3%) 50(9.9%) 
Industry 
employee 
6(17.1%) 11(14.3%) 36(20.5%) 45(22.4%) 13(25.5%) 111(20.6%) 38(19%) 62(20.9%) 100(20.2%) 23(19%) 85(21.4%) 108(20.8%) 
Office 
employee 
3(8.6%) 13(16.9%) 49(27.8%) 51(25.4%) 14(27.5%) 130(24.1%) 66(33%) 55(18.6%) 121(24.4%) 29(24%) 92(24%) 121(24%) 
Student 4(11.4%) 18(23.4%) 35(19.9%) 36(17.9%) 9(17.6%) 102(18.9%) 36(18%) 60(20.3%) 96(19.4%) 21(17.4%) 77(20.1%) 98(19.4%) 
Unemployed 2(5.7%) 6(7.8%) 7(4%) 13(6.5%) 2(3.9%) 30(5.6%) 14(7%) 13(4.4%) 27(5.4%) 11(9.1%) 18(4.7%) 29(5.7%) 
Retired 19(54.3%) 21(27.3%) 32(18.2%) 30(14.9%) 10(19.6%) 112(20.7%) 23(11.5%) 80(27%) 103(20.8%) 19(15.7%) 83(21.6%) 102(20.2%) 
Income:        
Under 4K 7(21.9%) 22(30.1%) 33(21.4%) 26(14.6%) 4(8.5%) 92(19%) 27(15%) 59(22.3%) 86(19.4%) 19(17.1%) 67(19.6%) 86(19%) 
4K-7K 11(34.4%) 22(30.1%) 34(22.1%) 45(25.3%) 14(29.8%) 126(26%) 39(21.7%) 76(28.8%) 115(25.9%) 26(23.4%) 91(26.7%) 117(25.9%) 
7K-11K 5(15.6%) 10(13.7%) 35(22.7%) 44(24.7%) 9(19.1%) 103(21.3%) 50(27.8%) 47(17.8%) 97(21.8%) 27(24.3%) 70(20.5%) 97(21.5%) 
11K-18K 5(15.6%) 8(11%) 37(24%) 36(20.2%) 7(14.9%) 93(19.2%) 36(20%) 49(18.6%) 85(19.1%) 19(17.1%) 69(20.2%) 88(19.5%) 
18K-25K 3(9.4%) 8(11%) 7(4.5%) 17(9.6%) 9(19.1%) 44(9.1%) 17(9.4%) 21(8%) 38(8.6%) 14(12.6%) 28(8.2%) 42(9.3%) 
25K and up 1(3.1%) 3(4.1%) 8(5.2%) 10(5.6%) 4(8.5%) 26(5.4%) 11(6.1%) 12(4.5%) 23(5.2%) 6(5.4%) 16(4.7%) 22(4.9%) 
Total/% of 
total 




1 -The abbreviation WCIOM refers to All-Russian Center of Public Opinion 
Research 
2 - The abbreviation INDEM refers to Information Science for Democracy 
3 -The abbreviation FOM refers to Fund of Public Opinion 
4 -The Russian national average is 9.4% for 2011 and 18.3% for 2001 
according to the State Committee of Statistics www.gks.ru  
5 - In the Volgograd region 15.4% of populations' income is derived from the 
entrepreneurship (16.4% nation-wide), 33% from hired employees’ salary 
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(40.6% nation-wide), 21.4% from welfare payments (17.8%) and 5.4 % from 
real estate income (6.3% nation-wide). 
6 - also see www.levada.ru  for more details  
7 -On further discussion of construct validity for procedural justice variables 
see Reisig et al (2007) 
8 - The monthly income is measured in Russian rubles. The currency rate is 
approximately $1 to 30 Russian rubles at the time of data collection   
 
 
 
 
 
 
